Exhibit B · Section 4

Strategic drones from Bahir Dar Air Base

Sudan has been attacked not only by expendable drones, but by armed strategic drones of a class that only States possess. They flew from Bahir Dar Air Base, an installation of the Ethiopian National Defence Force.

Bahir Dar Air Base

Bahir Dar, on the southern shore of Lake Tana in the Amhara Region, hosts an Ethiopian Air Force base used for armed-drone operations. Satellite imagery reviewed by Sudan identifies the apron and hangars from which the strategic drones were prepared, the taxi route and the take-off runway.

Satellite image of the pre-flight preparation area, taxi route and take-off run at Bahir Dar — **Figure 7.** Bahir Dar Air Base, Amhara Region, Ethiopia: the drone apron (circled) and runway, and the pre-flight preparation area, taxi route and take-off run (satellite imagery annotated by Military Intelligence).

The El Obeid interception, 17 March 2026

On Tuesday 17 March 2026 Sudanese air defences brought down a Bayraktar Akıncı strategic drone near El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan. Data recovered from the aircraft showed that it had been launched from the Bahir Dar area, on 1 and 17 March, to strike positions in several Sudanese states.¹² The reconstructed track reveals the method: the aircraft flew west across Blue Nile State, entered the airspace of South Sudan to skirt Sudanese air defences, and then turned north through Kordofan to its targets, a route of about 1,000 km planned by a professional air-operations staff.

Recovered flight track from Bahir Dar to North Kordofan — **Figure 8.** Flight track of the Akıncı downed near El Obeid, as recovered and plotted by Military Intelligence: Bahir Dar to North Kordofan (left), detail over Kordofan including the attack orbit (right).

Detail of the flight track over Kordofan including the attack orbit — **Figure 8.** Flight track of the Akıncı downed near El Obeid, as recovered and plotted by Military Intelligence: Bahir Dar to North Kordofan (left), detail over Kordofan including the attack orbit (right).

Theatre of operations: launch bases in Ethiopia, attributed launch-to-target lines, the reconstructed Akıncı track and logged incidents by area — **Figure 9.** The theatre of operations: launch bases on Ethiopian territory, the attributed launch–target relationships, the reconstructed Bahir Dar–El Obeid track through South Sudanese airspace, and the number of logged incidents by area.

The Ad-Damazin interception, 23 May 2026

On Saturday 23 May 2026 a second Akıncı was brought down near Ad-Damazin, about 75 km from the Ethiopian border, after entering Sudanese airspace from Ethiopia. It was intercepted by a Sudanese Akıncı.¹³ Its engine, satellite communications equipment and avionics were recovered.

Wreckage of the Akıncı downed near El Obeid with Sudanese soldiers — **Figure 10.** Akıncı wreckage recovered in Sudan: near El Obeid, 17 March 2026 (left), and the engine of the Akıncı downed near Ad-Damazin, 23 May 2026 (right).

Engine of the Akıncı downed near Ad-Damazin — **Figure 10.** Akıncı wreckage recovered in Sudan: near El Obeid, 17 March 2026 (left), and the engine of the Akıncı downed near Ad-Damazin, 23 May 2026 (right).

Serial-numbered components

The wreckage carries manufacturer data plates. Each bears the NATO Commercial and Government Entity code T9710, a part number and an individual serial number. One plate carries a NATO Stock Number with the country code 27 (Türkiye). These identifiers allow the manufacturer and the exporting State to establish, from their own records, the airframe to which each component belongs and the customer to which it was delivered.

**Table 2.** Baykar and Aselsan components identified in Akıncı wreckage. The Link B3 transceiver also bears NATO Stock Number 5820-27-063-3073.
Component (as labelled)	Part number	Serial number	NCAGE	Recovered at
Panel, Control, Type 2 (Gövde Yan)	131100056	241200054	T9710	El Obeid, 17 Mar
Computer, Navigation (Bilgisayar, Seyrüsefer)	134600002	250100140	T9710	El Obeid, 17 Mar
Air Data Terminal Unit Set, Link B2 (HVT)	143100084	231200572	T9710	El Obeid, 17 Mar
Central Unit, Airborne Radio (Kontrol Ünitesi)	143100953	250200003	T9710	Ad-Damazin, 23 May
Transceiver Unit, Link B3, Airborne	10-1108010100	240400695	T9710	Ad-Damazin, 23 May
Communications unit (Aselsan)	-	-	-	El Obeid and Ad-Damazin

Baykar control panel data plate, PN 131100056, SN 241200054, NCAGE T9710 — Control panel plate

Baykar navigation computer data plate, PN 134600002, SN 250100140 — Navigation computer plate

Baykar air data terminal unit plate, PN 143100084, SN 231200572 — Air data terminal plate

Bayraktar Akıncı marking on the control panel

Central control unit with Baykar plate — Central control unit

Satellite communications antenna dish — Satellite communications antenna

Figure 11. Manufacturer plates and major components recovered from the Akıncı wreckage. Select an image to enlarge it.

Strategic drones shot down

#	Date	Location	Type	Launch site
1	Tuesday 17 March 2026	El Obeid, North Kordofan	Bayraktar Akıncı	Bahir Dar, Ethiopia
2	Saturday 23 May 2026	Ad-Damazin, Blue Nile	Bayraktar Akıncı	Bahir Dar, Ethiopia
3	Sunday 23 August 2026	Dindiro, Blue Nile	Bayraktar Akıncı	Ethiopia
4	Monday 12 October 2026	Wad el-Mahi, Blue Nile	Bayraktar TB2	Ethiopia
5	Thursday 22 October 2026	Bikori, Blue Nile	Bayraktar TB2	Ethiopia

Why a strategic drone points to a State

The Akıncı is not a militia weapon. It is a twin-engine strategic aircraft with a wingspan of about twenty metres and a take-off weight of around six tonnes. It requires a paved runway, a ground-control station, satellite communications, a supply chain of manufacturer-supported spare parts, and aircrews trained by the manufacturer. Türkiye exports it only to sovereign governments, under end-use undertakings.

Ethiopia is a declared operator. The Ethiopian Air Force received Bayraktar Akıncı aircraft in a public ceremony at Harar Meda Air Base in January 2024, in the presence of the Chief of General Staff, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula; it has operated Bayraktar TB2 drones since the Tigray war.¹⁴ The Rapid Support Forces possess no runway in eastern Sudan, no satellite ground segment and no Akıncı crews.

Finding B

Armed strategic drones of a type exported only to governments, and operated by the Ethiopian Air Force, flew from Bahir Dar Air Base to attack Sudan. Whether flown by Ethiopian crews or by a third State's crews using an Ethiopian air base, the attacks were launched from Ethiopia's sovereign territory and from a facility under its exclusive control.